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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
was launched by a United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 
December 1970.1 In its trials and tribulations since that time, this 
latest international legal codifying conference may remind us of the 
mythical Labors of Sisyphus. Four years of preparatory work in 
committee stage culminated in a marathon series of conference ses-
sions at Caracas in mid-1974, extending over 10 weeks and attended 
by some 5,000 delegates and observers from 148 states. When the 
Caracas sessions ended without being able to produce any agree-
ment, the Conference was then adjourned to Geneva in the spring 
of 1975, where an eight-week series of conference sessions again 
ended without an agreement. The Conference has now been ad-
journed to New York for the spring of 1976, with promise of still 
another round of negotiations after that. With a positive achieve-
ment record such as this, the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea has invited occasional critical comment as to the 
swollen n um hers of official delegates, observers, and supporting 
functionaries, and has raised questions as to specialist professional 
expertise, or at least as to the degree of serious commitment to the 
postulated objective of a timely codification of the Law of the Sea. 
Typical of this tendency to denigrate the Third Law of the Sea 
Conference and its standing armies of political representatives and 
officials is the appraisal of a well-established North American daily 
newspaper, nmmally noted for the sobriety of its political assess-
ments and appraisals. The newspaper was moved to describe the 
Conference as "float[ing] from spa to shining spa, " 2 and compared 
it to that "oldest established permanent floating crap game in New 
* The following article derives from a paper prepared for the World Congress on Philoso-
phy of Law and Social Philosophy held at St. Louis, Missouri, in August 1975. 
** Queen's Counsel, Barrister and Solicitor; Professor of International Law and Rela-
tions, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada; Membre de l'lnstitut de llioit Interna-
tional. 
1. G.A.Res. 2750(c), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 26, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970). 
2. Editorial, On to Calcutta, Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1974, at 8, col. 1. 
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York,"3 musically memoralized in Broadway's "Guys and Dolls." 
The dispassionate scientific observer is aware that the United 
Nations Organization, its specialized agencies, and its specialized 
conferences are subject, no less than national governments, to Par-
kinson's Law on proliferating bureaucracy. The really serious ques-
tion must be: to what extent has the patent failure of the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea been caused by 
difficulties of a temporary or casual nature, involving discernible 
faults in the Conference planning, preparation, and organization; 
and to what extent, by contrast, the failure goes to philosophical or 
policy conflicts inherent in the subject matter of the Conference, 
involving too heavy a burden of balancing or reconciling the con-
flicting national interests involved. 
II. THE PROCEDURAL (ADJECTIVAL) LAW DEFECTS OF 
THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE 
A comparison of the planning, preparation, and organization of 
the Third Law of the Sea Conference with earlier international codi-
fying efforts in the same general field is instructive. The First 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, meeting in Ge-
neva in 1958, gave rise to four separate, though interrelated, multi-
lateral conventions, 4 all of which received the stipulated number of 
ratifications and so became law within eight years of the completion 
of the 1958 Geneva sessions. The Second United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea, held at Geneva in 1960, was concerned, in 
essence, with settling important unfinished business from the 1958 
Conference, mainly the breadth of the territorial sea and fishery 
limits. The 1960 Conference did in fact secure majority votes for two 
proposals, but these votes fell short of the necessary two-thirds ma-
jority and so failed to become law. The more important proposal, 
which sought to establish a uniform breadth for the territorial sea, 
fell short of the required two-thirds majority by one vote. 
One important procedural or organizational difference between 
3. Letter to the Editor from John R. Stevenson, chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 
Caracas Conference, Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1974, at 12, col. 4. In this letter, Ambassador 
Stevenson strenuously objects to the Wall Street Journal's derogatory characterization of the 
Third United Nations conference. 
4. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done April 29, 1958, 
[1964) 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964); Conven-
tion on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, [1962) 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 
U.N.T.S . 82 (effective Sept. 30, 1962); Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, [1966) 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S . No. 5969, 559 
U.N.T.S. 285 (effective Mar. 20, 1966); Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 
1958, [1964) 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S . 311 (effective June 10, 1964) . 
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the First United Nations Conference in 1958 and the Second Confer-
ence in 1960 (a difference which applies in greater degree to the 
unfinished Third Conference of 1974 and 1975) is that the 1958 
Conference followed the long-established "classical" route to legal 
codification. The formal Conference began with an agreed basic 
text of draft articles, formulated by an expert committee or commis-
sion capable of claiming authoritative status in its own right. The 
text formed the principal agenda of debate and discussion at the 
Conference itself. The 1958 Conference began with a set of 73 draft 
articles, which were the result of seven years of detailed work by the 
International Law Commission (l.L.C.) .. The influence of the 
scientific-legal expertise of the I.L.C., resulting from the high intel-
lectual prestige and consummate technical drafting skills of its 
members, is apparent in the final texts of the four conventions 
adopted by the 1958 Conference.5 By contrast, in the interim period 
between the 1958 Conference and the 1960 Conference, the I.L.C. 
was not called upon for advice, perhaps due to the time factor. In 
any event, the I.L.C. had made no specific proposals on any of the 
several major questions carried over to the resumed 1960 discus-
sions. There was therefore no single expert text before the 1960 
Conference, but only various proposals submitted by the different 
governments. 
In the case of the Third Conference, even though the range of 
subjects to be canvassed was essentially as broad or broader than 
in 1958, there was again no basic text but only a mass of disparate 
materials prepared by various working groups and delegations. 
These materials were highlighted by a six-volume report from a 
United Nations committee, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond . the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction. This latter collection, far from adhering to the I.L.C. 
and general "classical" drafting formula of presenting a single draft 
text as a basis for debate and discussion, adopted the novel drafting 
variant of attempting to overcome the major disagreements that 
patently existed on so many points by presenting the alternative, 
often conflicting, proposals side by side, hundreds in all. The prob-
lem was compounded not merely by having a profusion of different 
texts on the same subject, but also by the sheer quantity of materi-
als involved. This condition was itself a product, in some part, of 
the marked increase in the number of governments participating in 
5. See generally Stone, On the Vocation of the International Law Commission, 57 
COLUM. L. REV. 16 (1957). 
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the Third Conference, in comparison to the First Conference in 
1958. The number of participating countries increased arithmeti-
cally from 86 to 148, with the added handicap that the new arrivals 
were not always the best prepared nor the most succinct or relevant 
in their contributions to the Conference debates. 
There were, then, very evident faults in the operational proce-
dures of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
in 1974 and 1975: the failure to begin with one agreed expert text; 
the failure to make sure that the drafting committee actually ap-
pointed by the Conference would be fully representative of all the 
major states, politically and intellectually authoritative in terms of 
membership, and armed with effective powers to guide and develop 
Conference thinking;6 and the failure to achieve general satisfaction 
as to voting principles (going beyond the Gentleman's Agreement 
as to the need to exhaust the "consensus" process in the first 
instance), 7 which could ensure that a conference charged with devel-
oping a codifying treaty as its end product really would produce new 
rules capable of achieving general acceptance and not simply an-
other exercise in "soft law."8 These self-inflicted wounds undoubt-
edly rendered more difficult the tasks of the Third United Nations 
Conference and contributed, in measure, to its eventual practical 
6. The drafting committee of the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference 
suffered from a number of in-built disabilities that seriously weakened its potential political 
authority and influence. Its membership was unusually large and unwieldy-23 members in 
all- yet it was not especially representative in terms of political power. Only two of the 
Permanent Members of the Security Council-the United States and the Soviet Union-were 
members of the drafting committee, and there was no officially francophone state. Beyond 
that, the committee could neither seize itself of matters of its own volition, modify the 
essentials of documents submitted to it, reopen the debate in depth on any questions, nor 
initiate its own texts. It existed simply for the purposes of referral by the plenary Conference 
and its three committees, and thus was reduced, from the beginning, to a purely mechanical 
and necessarily subordinate role. See generally Vignes, Organisation et reglement interieur 
de la III e Conference sur le droit de la mer, 91 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 337 (1975). 
7. United Nations, Rules of Procedure for the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, rule 39 (Required majority) & appendix (Declaration incorporating the "Gentleman's 
Agreement"), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/30/Rev.l, at 9 & 17, 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1199, 1205 
& 1209 (1974) (adopted at the Caracas session, June 27, 1974). See generally Vignes, Will the 
Third Conference on the Law of the Sea work according to the Consensus Rule ?, 69 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 119 (1975); Lacharriere, Consensus et Nations Unies, 1968 ANNUAIRE FRAN<;AIS DE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 9; Bastid, Observations sur la pratique du consensus, MULTITUDO LEGUM 
Jus UNUM: FESTSCHRIFT FOR WILHELM WENGLER 11 (1973); Jenks, Unanimity, the Veto, 
Weighed Voting, Special and Simplified Majorities and Consensus as Modes of Decision in 
International Law, CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD 
MCNAIR 488 (1965) . 
8. Vignes, supra note 6, at 364 (citing Jean Dupuy) . 
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breakdown and inability to produce agreement at either its 1974 or 
1975 extended sessions. 
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COD/FICA TION VERSUS 
INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 
It is impossible to avoid the conclusion, however, that even with 
the best of procedural rules, having profited from the years of accu-
mulated technical experience of the old League of Nations and legal 
codifying conferences of the United Nations itself, the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea would still have had 
enormous political difficulties in overcoming the important sub-
stantive differences among the 148 participating countries that were 
inherent in the subject matter forming the official Agenda of the 
Conference. This raises the further fundamental question of 
whether the term Conference on the Law of the Sea was not in itself 
a misnomer. While no doubt an unintentional one, it had important 
practical consequences for the arriving at agreed new international 
rules to govern the regime of the seas, the sea-bed, and marine 
resources generally. Legal codification is more than mere mechani-
cal collecting and restating of pre-existing legal rules; it involves a 
creative element in which new legal principles are formulated and 
interpolated in the interstices of the old. It remains, however, a 
limited, technical operation involving certain canons of personal 
self-restraint on the part of the drafters involved. A mandate for 
legal codification is certainly not a license for a general exercise in 
law-making that acknowledges no political constraints in terms of 
past legal doctrine. The general law-making conference that has a 
positive mandate to construct and elaborate new law, and is not 
merely limited to legal codification, has its place, of course. But its 
roles and missions are fundamentally different from those of the 
legal codifying conference; otherwise, the term legal codification no 
longer has a precise connotation.9 
Once the limits of the four multilateral conventions produced 
by the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea are 
transcended, we are into issues of sheer political choice, and not 
codification or restatement of existing legal doctrine. By this token, 
the 1960 Conference on the Law of the Sea could certainly, as a 
technical matter, have codified the existing international law as to 
9. See Stone, supra note 5; Jennings, The Progressive Development of International Law 
and its Codification, 24 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 301 (1947); C. DE V1sscHER, THEORIES ET REALITES 
EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 177 (1953) . 
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the width of the territorial sea. Indeed, as a technical, scientific-
legal matter, that would have been easy to do in 1960. But the 
delegates to the 1960 Conference (or at least a minority among them 
sufficient to impede the achievement of a two-thirds majority) sim-
ply did not like the existing customary international law rule and 
chose to block all attempts to codify that rule in permanent statu-
tory (treaty) form. The problem in 1960 was a political one, not a 
legal one. It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the problem 
in both 1974 and 1975 was not in finding and concretizing the exist-
ing rules of the Law of the Sea, but in mobilizing sufficient political 
support and political enthusiasm behind those already existing 
rules. In the absence of a legally effective consensus as to new inter-
national law rules, the old rules on normal principles of legal inter-
pretation remain in force and subject to progressive, generic exten-
sion through individual initiatives on the part of individual states 
in ways not in themselves incompatible with existing international 
law. 
Instead of Law of the Sea as the official agenda for the Third 
Conference, one might have spoken, more properly, of Regime of the 
Sea, 10 thus taking away the vicarious legal prestige otherwise at-
tached to the political act of remaking the old law in the image of a 
claimed new majority in the World Community. 
IV. THE SUBSTANTIVE DILEMMAS OF THE THIRD 
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE: THE "OLD" LAW OF 
THE SEA 
Next let us examine the main conflicting interests present in 
that recently renewed political exercise entrusted to the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. 
The existing (or old) Law of the Sea is essentially the product 
of long-observed practice of states, concretized over more than three 
centuries into the rules of customary international law11 and codi-
fied, in quite substantial measure, in the four Geneva conventions 
of 1958. The existing Law of the Sea, as customary international 
law, or at least a codification of that customary law, undoubtedly 
10. See generally M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC LAW OF THE OCEANS: A CON-
TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (1962). 
11. The literature on the classical Law of the Sea is legion, for example that standard, 
well-respected text, C. CoLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (4th rev. ed. 1959). For 
an imaginative contemporary text see R. DUPUY, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CURRENT PROBLEMS 
(1974). 
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reflects the interests and aspirations of the politically dominant 
states throughout that same time period. These were the states 
formed on the rise of commerce and thriving on the development of 
international trade and intercourse without the unnecessary fetters 
and restrictions which stemmed from archaic legal rules and pre-
scriptions. In contrast to the mare clausum of the Papally-
sanctioned Spanish-Portuguese imperial maritime hegemony, the 
mare liberum of Grotius and of Europe after the Treaty of West-
phalia was not moved by a narrow spirit of national particularism 
or accompanying selfish desires to lock up the sea and its resources 
into a series of closed national compartments. Instead, the "mod-
ern" (post-Treaty of Westphalia) world of the emergent nation-state 
developed, to an extent which can only be described as surprising, 
a sense of mutuality and reciprocity of interest on the part of all the 
then active participants in the World Community. This mutuality 
involved the maximization of the interests of all states and the 
necessary cutting down, in consequence, of overly particularistic 
special claims and assertions of individual states. In the full spirit 
of the phrase used by the United Nations General Assembly as the 
postulated objective of a new regime of the seas, the sea-bed, and 
marine resources generally, the post-Westphalia new nation-states, 
in opting so resolutely for a mare liberum, accepted the seas and 
marine resources as the "common heritage of all mankind." 12 
V. CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO MARE LIBERUM 
A phenomenon of our own times is that, after more than three 
centuries of mare liberum, we are now seeing the emergence of a new 
species of mare clausum, not merely through uninhibited national 
claims as put forward in international arenas like the United Na-
tions Law of the Sea Conferences, but also through concrete state 
practice as asserted in unilateral state actions trenching upon the 
classical freedom of the seas and the free availability of its resources 
to all comers. 13 Such unilateral state actions have been either inef-
fectively protested by other states or else not protested at all, since 
other states are looking, in their turn, to their own possibilities of 
unilateral action in a sort of general quid pro quo. Sometimes these 
unilateral state actions are directed to what would seem to be pro-
tection of genuinely comprehensive World Community interests, to 
12. G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970). 
13. Friedman, Selden Redivivus: Towards a Partition of the Seas?, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 
757 (1971). 
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protection of the natural environment or of increasingly scarce natu-
ral resources against abuses of the classical freedoms of the sea. 
These abuses are by nation-states whose own activities would cer-
tainly qualify, under internal, municipal law principles, as exam-
ples or case studies in abus de droit and so would be subject to 
social control through law. Examples of this category of national 
self-help might be individual nation-state action of a preventive or 
control nature, in default of effective international or multi-state 
action; against marine pollution or damage to the shoreline and 
environment of the littoral state; or individual nation-state action 
directed to protection of recognized national fishing grounds, out-
side national territorial waters as classically defined, against deple-
tion or exhaustion by reckless over-fishing on the part of other 
states. 
A further category of unilateral state action might prove, on 
examination, to be mixed in character: partly in furtherance of 
genuinely comprehensive World Community interests in default of 
effective World Community action, and partly designed to advance 
national special interests. A final category of unilateral state ac-
tions, going beyond the ambit of classical international law (regret-
tably, this latter category seems all too prevalent today), would be 
the pursuit of narrow national interests, .usually of an economic 
character, at the expense of all other members of the World Com-
munity, and under the guise of protection and furtherance of World 
Community interests. For example, the proclamation of vast so-
called pollution control zones in the high seas, going well beyond the 
necessities of any immediately foreseeable cases; the declaration of 
extensive fishing monopoly zones, again extending far out into the 
high seas as classically defined; the attempt to control innocent 
passage through traditionally recognized international straits and 
waterways, through the devices of extending the national territorial 
sea or developing novel theories (for example, the so-called Archi-
pelago doctrine) which can be no stretch of the imagination be 
regarded as analogical extensions of existing classical international 
law doctrine. These can be no legitimate exercises in international 
law-making in the absence of firm international treaties that can 
achieve general acceptance. 
VI. THE NON-ROLE OF THE SUPER-POWERS IN 
DEVELOPING A NEW REGIME OF THE SEA 
Perhaps part of the blame for the anarchy caused by individual 
national claims and pretensions that trench upon classical 
8
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international law-based doctrines of mare liberum must lie with the 
super-powers. Recognizing the constructive leadership supplied by 
the Soviet Union and the United States in leading the way to the 
achievement and concretization of the new norms and rules of inter-
national law in areas such as the banning of atmospheric nuclear 
tests, the control of nuclear proliferation, and the demilitarization 
of the moon and of outer space generally, 14 one is entitled to ask why 
the two bloc leaders, granted the existence of so many evident points 
of agreement and harmony between them as to present and future 
development of the Law of the Sea, the sea-bed, and marine re-
sources generally, could not have devised between them a model 
treaty or treaties in this area. Such a treaty might have proceeded 
on the same principles of mutuality and reciprocity of interest that 
characterized their negotiations in the area of disarmament, and 
then could have been opened up to general signature and ratifica-
tion by other lesser or secondary powers. The answer must be that 
the two super-powers gave too much priority to their own special 
(bipolar) peace-keeping interests, forgetting that with the 
achievement of coexistence and big-power detente any treaties in 
this area would tend to be largely historical legal footnotes to sub-
stantive accords already reached in other political (non-legal) are-
nas. When the two super-powers finally turned to the regime of the 
seas, it was, one might suggest, already too late. The claims of the 
economically underprivileged and technologically underdeveloped 
countries for a special national economic zone beyond the limits of 
the territorial sea as customarily defined and established to date 
were greeted perhaps too diffidently, and certainly too dilatorily, by 
the super-powers. All these claims for a special national economic 
zone have now been happily absorbed by the Chinese Communist 
government and integrated, with wit and also some literary ele-
gance, into its campaign against the two super-powers' more 
traditionally-based positions on the Law of the Sea. What the 
Chinese now call the ''Soviet Revisionist Principle of the Freedom 
of the Seas" is linked by the Chinese to what they style as a joint 
Soviet-U.S. claim to a "super-powers' Maritime Hegemonism." The 
lesson of the Sibylline books is to accept the possible when it is still 
timely-a lesson which Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice drives home with 
14. For a further development of this thesis see E. McWHINNEY, "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" 
AND SOVIET-WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964); E. MCWHINNEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
WORLD REVOLUTION (1967); E. MCWHINNEY, CONFLIT IDEOLOGIQUE ET 0RDRE PUBLIC MONDIAL 
(1970). 
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regard to the ultimate failure of the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference 
to stabilize the breadth of the territorial sea where relatively modest 
limits, not incompatible with classical international law rules, were 
still capable of being successfully maintained and concretized in 
permanent, multilateral treaty form. 15 
VII. THE MAIN POLITICAL CONFLICTS OF THE THIRD 
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE 
A. The Four Geneva Conventions of 1958 
The starting point for identification and analysis of the main 
areas of political conflict at the Third United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea must lie in a consideration of the four multi-
lateral conventions adopted at the First United Nations Conference 
held in Geneva in 1958: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone, 16 the Convention on the High Seas, 17 the Con-
vention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
High Seas, 18 and the Convention on the Continental Shelf. 19 
While the principle of the freedom of the high seas (defined, by 
way of extensity, in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, Article 
2, to comprise freedom of navigation, freedom of fishing, freedom to 
lay submarine cables and pipelines, and freedom to fly over the high 
seas20) is basic to the concept of mare liberum, it has historically 
included a special exception in favor of the territorial sea which, up 
to the time of the First United Nations Conference in 1958, was 
always considered to be (with some minor, historically-sanctioned 
variations in favor of individual nation-states) three marine miles 
from the low-water line along the coast. The chance at the 1958 
Geneva Conference to codify formally the three-mile limit to the 
territorial sea in treaty form was missed for political reasons. The 
resultant opportunity to compromise politically on a six-mile or 
even a twelve-mile limit as a still reasonable balance between the 
traditional mare liberum position and the emerging economic par-
15. Fitzmaurice, The future of Public International Law and of the International Legal 
System in the circumstances of today, INSTlTUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, LIVRE DU CENTENAIRE 
1873-1973: EVOLUTION ET PERSPECTIVES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1973). 
16. [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964). 
17. [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective Sept. 30, 1962) . 
18. [1966] 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (effective Mar. 20, 1966). 
19. [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471, T.l.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective June 10, 1964). 
20. [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, 2314, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 84 (effective Sept. 
30, 1962). 
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ticularist claims of various nation-states was also lost, though by the 
narrowest of margins. The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone reflects this political impasse for, while 
predicated upon the existence of the principle of a territorial sea, it 
nowhere defines the limits of that sea.21 The issue of defining the 
width of the territorial sea remained, therefore, one of the prime 
responsibilities of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea and the special charge of its Committee II, which was 
concerned with the limits of national jurisdiction. 
B. The Territorial Sea, its Limits, and the "Patrimonial Sea" 
The main difference between the political climate of the First 
and Second United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea and 
that of the Third Conference was that by the mid-1970's, modest 
political compromises relating to the traditional three-mile limit 
were no longer possible. This was because of the plethora of special 
national claims, trenching upon the erstwhile freedoms of the high 
seas, that had developed over the intervening decade and a half. By 
far, the more important of these infringements on the classical free-
doms of the high seas related to the development and expansion of 
the concept of the contiguous zone. As late as the 1920's, this zone 
was no more than a limited, embryonic notion of a special area, 
immediately beyond the three-mile territorial sea, in which police 
and customs-revenue control measures could be applied by the lit-
toral state. In the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Con-
tiguous Zone, it is expressly stipulated in Article 24(2) that the 
contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the base-
line from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured (that 
is, the low-water line along the coast).22 By the mid-1970's, a consid-
erable number of states, especially those having extensive fishing 
and marine resources located very close to their coastlines and 
limited natural resources in other areas, had already asserted exten-
sive claims to national sovereignty over coastal waters and their 
marine resources. These claims extended beyond the traditional 
three-mile territorial sea, and even beyond a six-mile or twelve-mile 
sea, and often extended as far out as 200 miles from the low-water 
line along the coast. Some support for such unilateral extensions of 
21. See [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.l.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 
1964). 
22. [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, 1612, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 220 (effective Sept. 
10, 1964). 
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sovereignty, especially in the case of "one-crop" countries, could 
perhaps be derived from international institutions as respectable 
and presumably (at that time) as politically detached as the World 
Court. 23 But these newer claims obviously ran into direct conflict 
with the internsts of the great maritime trading states having or 
using merchant shipping fleets; with those of the two super-powers 
(the Soviet Union and the United States) with their large naval 
fleets; and, indeed, with those of the few, unfortunate states having 
no identifiable marine or related resources located close to their 
coasts and therefore having nothing much to trade off or bargain 
against any carving up of the coastal waters and their resources. 
These latter states, for the most part, leaned firmly toward the 
traditional rules of a three-mile (or at least limited) territorial sea, 
with, at the most, restricted police-control authority extending 
immediately beyond the territorial sea. Where even modest exten-
sion of the territorial sea would result in straits that were clearly 
international straits (subject, as such, to the right of innocent pas-
sage by ships of all countries) falling under national jurisdiction, the 
great maritime states also pressed firmly for the maintenance and 
preservation of the historically "international" character of such 
waterways. They equally resisted the Archipelago doctrine, under 
which all the waters between islands forming part of one national 
territory (Indonesia and the Philippines, for example) are national 
in character and so fall under national sovereignty and control. It 
is suggested that, with respect to straits and archipelagos, a new 
political compromise that would guarantee the right of innocent 
passage or freedom of navigation through designated sea-lanes 
might eventually reconcile the conflicting interests in this area. 
Similarly, the idea of a twelve-mile territorial sea plus a 200-mile 
"economic" zone (the so-called "patrimonial sea"24 in which the 
coastal state would have exclusive fishing rights) is being advanced 
as a reasonable basis for contemporary novation or rewriting of the 
classical international law-based three-mile territorial sea concept. 
The established states, and particularly the two super-powers, 
tend to find that the existing classical international law rules corre-
spond very well to their own national self-interest and to the politi-
cal accommodations inevitably made within their own national po-
litical community to produce the external consensus reflected in 
23. See, e.g., Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116. 
24. R. DUPUY, supra note 11, at 40. 
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their own national foreign policy at any time. For example, the 
practical compromise evidently made within both the Soviet Union 
and the United States between national fishing interests and na-
tional defense interests will be augmented by the political trade-offs 
that the contemporary nationalist proponents of mare clausum are 
able to offer in other cognate areas-the continental shelf, for exam-
ple, and the development of the economic resources of the sea-bed 
and the ocean floor. 
C. The Continental Shelf, the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and 
their Resources 
The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, responding to 
the rapid development of assertedly customary international law-
based claims to an exclusive national right to exploit the mineral 
resources of the continental shelf beyond the national territorial sea 
(stemming from President Truman's Proclamation of 194525) , for-
mally recorded and codified the sovereign rights of the coastal state 
to explore and exploit the natural resources of the continental shelf. 
The continental shelf itself was defined in the 1958 Convention, 
disjunctively, as referring: 
to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the 
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 
metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent 
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said 
areas .... 26 
The first part of the 1958 definition clearly provides firm and 
objectively verifiable criteria for legally limiting the political asser-
tion of national claims. The second part of the definition, however, 
based on mining engineering knowledge of the time, has clearly been 
outstripped by rapidly developing science and technology which has 
made its exploitability criterion a progressively expanding stan-
dard, licensing an ever-expanding national development and utili-
zation of the economic and mineral resources of the sea-bed. While 
the connotation of the term continental shelf does not include the 
ocean floor beyond the continental shelf itself, no part of the conti-
nental shelf would be potentially excluded from national exploita-
tion. The technological capacity of the state outside whose terri-
25. Presidential Proclamation 2667, Sept. 28, 1945, 10 Fed . Reg. 12303, 59 Stat. 884 
(1945) . 
26. Convention on the Contenental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, art. 1 [1964] 1 U.S .T. 
471, 473, T .I.A .S. No. 5578, 499 U.N .T .S. 311 , 312 (effective June 10, 1964). 
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torial sea the continental shelf extends alone defines and determines 
the spatial limits to the exercise of its sovereign rights over the 
continental shelf. 27 This is clear as a matter of legal logic, based on 
the strict interpretation of the terms of the 1958 Convention, and 
so no question can arise of any political barter or exchange of those 
rights as payment for a recognition of current nationalist preten-
sions to the patrimonial sea. 
On the other hand, the legal situation of the ocean floor beyond 
the limits of the continental shelf is not so clear. It is not dealt with 
in the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf28 and it may be 
argued that since that Convention concedes to the coastal state 
sovereign rights of exploitation over the natural resources of the 
continental shelf, it must, by implication, deny any rights beyond 
the continental shelfs limits. On the other hand, the more normal 
interpretation would seem to be that, in the absence of a treaty rule, 
the pre-existing customary international law rules govern. Thus, the 
ocean floor is open to all comers, on an equal basis, in terms of their 
capacity to explore it and to develop and exploit its natural re-
sources. It would be, of course, only a formal, juridical equality, 
since only a handful of the technologically most advanced, post-
industrial states are in any position, in the foreseeable future, to 
take up an option to explore and usefully develop the ocean floor 
beyond the limits of the continental shelf. 
It is this fact, perhaps more than any other, which both ex-
plains the political intransigence of certain Third World countries, 
especially the leaders of the so-called Group of 77, and gives a cer-
tain air of unreality to their contributions to the debates in the 
committee in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea specially charged with examining the status of the sea-bed 
beyond national jurisdiction. Certainly United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 274929 (Declaration of Principles Governing 
the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond 
the Limits of National Jurisdiction) adopted in December 1970, 
postulates that the resources of these areas are the "common heri-
27. Compare Goldie, Where is the Continental Shelf's Outer Boundary?, 1 J. MAR. L. & 
CoM. 461 (1970). 
28. See [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (in force June 10, 
1964) . The Convention addresses itself mainly to the legal status of the continental shelf per 
se . 
29. G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970). 
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tage of mankind." United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
257430 (the so-called Moratorium Resolution) adopted in the pre-
vious year, purports to put these areas and their resources beyond 
the pale of national jurisdiction, "pending the establishment of 
[an] international regime"31 in the area. These are brave asser-
tions, but they suffer from the political vice inherent in all United 
Nations General Assembly resolutions, especially since the marked 
increase in United Nations membership with the accession of Third 
World countries; they are not generally accepted as authoritative, 
binding sources of international law, except so far as they may have 
been affirmatively and independently accepted by all main states.32 
In the absence of any authoritative new rule in this area, the major 
post-industrial states which have the technological capacity to de-
velop and exploit the resources of the ocean floor will no doubt see 
fit to exercise their undoubted right of proceeding in accord with 
both the capabilities and the demands of their national technolo-
gies. When the Group of 77 contend, therefore, for an International 
Sea-Bed Authority that alone shall have plenary powers to control 
and direct sea-bed and ocean floor activities, there is a certain ele-
ment of baying at the moon involved in the argumentation. The 
proposed International Sea-Bed Authority will need the active aid 
and encouragement of the technologically advanced states if it is 
ever to become effective, since it can obviously have no sanctions, 
in and of itself, to inhibit and restrain those technologically devel-
oped countries from going ahead of their own accord with their own 
national plans for exploitation of the resources in the ocean floor. 
The obvious political compromise solution is one which preserves 
the principle of an international authority, but which would make 
its function a regulatory one, rather than one seeking to impose 
direct administration and control. The basis for political give-and-
take is there, assuming a certain degree of rationality and common-
sense. The technologically developed states, for example, after their 
own experiences with the energy crisis and the rise in oil prices of 
recent years, can see merits in the coordination of even their own 
30. G.A. Res. 2574 (D), 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 10, U.N . Doc. A/7834 (1969). 
31. Id. at 11. 
32. On the issue of the normative law-making quality of United Nations General Assem-
bly resolutions, see Johnson, The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 98 (1955-56); R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963); C. PARRY, THE SOURCES 
AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965); LUKASHUK, ISTOCHNIKI MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA 
81 et seq . (1966) . 
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plans for development of the ocean floor resources, in terms of the 
economic implications of sea-bed mineral production upon produc-
tion from land-based mineral sources and upon the world pricing 
system generally. By and large, however, the technologically ad-
vanced states would seem to have much to gain by conceding the 
principle of an international control authority in return for a more 
conscious modesty, on the part of the less developed countries, in 
their pretensions as to nationalist extensions of the territorial sea 
and the so-called patrimonial sea. 
D. Preservation of the Marine Environment 
A third committee of the Third United Nations Conference has 
been concerned with issues of the preservation of the marine envi-
ronment and related questions of scientific research. While the ar-
gument for a broad control authority (including preventive or antic-
ipatory control) on the part of the coastal states in zones adjacent 
to their coasts33 is clear, it must be recognized that the balance of 
World Community interests in this area which recently favored ecol-
ogical interests has tilted a little in the other direction under the 
impact of the recent world energy crisis. Yet as to no other aspect 
of the Third United Nations Conference's official agenda does the 
congruence of the interests of the different nation-state participants 
seem more clear. So that here, at least, the problems seem second-
ary problems of an essentially lower-level technical character that 
can safely be left to the professional negotiators without the need 
for the same dramatic political interventions directed towards effec-
tuating ultimate political compromises that we can see in regard to 
the issues of the limits of the territorial sea, the existence of the so-
called patrimonial sea, and the utilization of the resources of the 
sea-bed and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction. The common 
interest of mankind in the protection of the natural environment is 
at least far more self-evident than the postulated common interests 
in other areas. Therefore, consensus on new principles of interna-
tional law here, or even on the imaginative restatement (codifica-
tion) of the "old" principles, should not be too difficult, and need 
not necessarily wait upon political agreement upon new principles 
to govern the other areas to which we have referred. 
33. Etudes des mesures internationales les plus aptes a prevenir la pollution des milieux 
maritimes (Andrassy, rapporteur), 1 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 547 et 
seq. (1969), 2 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 255 et seq. (1969) . 
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VIII. AFTERMATH TO THE FAILURE OF THE CARACAS 
AND GENEVA SESSIONS OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS 
CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 
In the absence of firm new international treaty rules that can 
achieve at least general, if not universal, acceptance by states, the 
older, classical, customary international law rules remain in force. 
As such, these older, classical, customary international law rules are 
capable of progressive generic extension in ways not incompatible 
with general international law, so as to meet new problem-situations 
(for example, the radical new possibilities thrown up by rapidly 
developing science and technology). 34 In a World Community where 
a plethora of mini-states, with a vocality often quite unrelated to 
power or technological capacity, may block achievement of new 
codifying treaties that will preserve the essence of mare liberum 
against intransigent national demands for mare clausum, it may be 
a salutary reminder to note that, on the basis of existing classical 
international law rules and their analogical extension on traditional 
law-making bases, the technologically advanced states probably 
have sufficient legal authority to go ahead of their own accord with 
plans for the development and utilization of the economic resources 
of the continental shelf and the sea-bed and ocean floor. And, they 
would certainly seem to have full legal authority to resist any closing 
_off of erstwhile international straits and other international water-
ways to the innocent passage of vessels of their own and other states. 
To say this is not to contend that the technologically advanced 
states should opt politically so to act, eschewing thereby the patient 
skills of compromise normally applied to the attempt to achieve any 
major international law-making, multilateral convention. But the 
objectives of some of the states participating in the Third United 
Nations Law of the Sea Conference quite transcend the limits of 
legal codification as that term is normally understood. It should be 
recognized frankly and openly that the international exercise held 
in 1974 and 1975, first in Caracas, then at Geneva, now at New York 
(and presumably at an even later date, elsewhere), is a highly politi-
cal exercise and only secondarily a legal one, and that the interna-
tional lawyer's specialized talents are necessarily ancillary in such 
an exercise to the more overtly political skills of diplomatic barter 
and exchange. For the international lawyer, great open-ended inter-
34. See McWhinney, Changing Science and Technology and International Law, 6 IND. 
L. REV. 172 (1972). 
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national gatherings like the Third United Nations Law of the Sea 
Conference call for the exercise of a certain degree of intellectual 
modesty and prudent professional self-restraint. Such gatherings 
further call for a recognition of the limitations of one's own highly 
specialized legal training and legal expertise in formulating the po-
litical panaceas that are far better achieved, if at all, by more ov-
ertly and avowedly political methods; to use Max Weber's phrase, 
by political honoratiores (professional Foreign Office diplomats and 
the like) and not by jurists as such. 
The latest, 117-page "negotiating text" with its many sections 
relating to fisheries, navigation, sovereignty, pollution, and off-
shore resources, which was salvaged from the wreckage of the 1975 
Geneva sessions of the Third Law of the Sea Conference,35 certainly 
by no stretch of the imagination compares with the agreed-upon, 
basic legal text and draft legal articles which were supplied by the 
expert International Law Commission to the 1958 Geneva Law of 
the Sea Conference and which so facilitated a successful conclusion 
to the 1958 Conference. But the "negotiating text" which is ex-
pressly stipulated by the President of the Conference as being "in-
formal in character ... not prejudic[ing] the position of any dele-
gation ... serv[ing] as a procedural device and only provid[ing] 
a basis for negotiation,"36 does constitute something of a political 
reprieve for the Third Law of the Sea Conference. Its present dele-
gates have at least one more chance to try to develop a genuinely 
inclusive regime of the sea which would restrict current excessively 
particularistic national claims, whether on the part of the two 
super-powers or of the developing countries, and simultaneously 
open up the sea and its resources to the new international science 
and technology on a basis that will provide the widest possible world 
community participation in and sharing of its riches. 
35. United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea: Informal Single Negotiating 
Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/pt. 1, 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 682 (1975). 
36. Not~ by the President of the Conference, id. 
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